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Abstract 
 
For decades, cost growth studies have been plentiful surrounding Department of 
Defense acquisitions.  Many different angles have been looked at to try and discover how 
to better estimate cost, what causes cost growth, and how to mitigate it.  This research 
addresses this through examining cost growth from a longitudinal perspective, evaluating 
cost growth factors at major program reviews, and assessing the cost growth by applying 
color rating metrics.  The results of this analysis show that breaking cost growth into 
longitudinal segments of a programs lifecycle allows the true behavior of cost growth to 
be seen, when it can often be masked in the traditional approach of evaluating lifecycle 
cost growth.  Additionally, when applying the proposed color rating system to cost 
growth factors, significant variables are found to have dependencies with cost growth 
factor color ratings.  Significant relationships shown in the results were most commonly 
like-color predictor and response variables.  Additionally DT&E is shown as a flag for 
high cost growth issues during a program lifecycle. 
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A LONGITUDINAL STUDY AND COLOR RATING SYSTEM 
OF ACQUISITION COST GROWTH 
 
I. Introduction 
 
General Issue 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has been facing steady pressure to reduce 
spending and program waste, and the near future will likely maintain this downward 
pressure.  Since 2010, the DoD budget has demonstrated a decreasing trend, as the 
administration attempts to regain control of government spending.  Figure 1, taken from the 
2016 Annual Report on Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, shows the DoD 
funding by budget accounts through the 2017 President’s Budget (PB).  This highlights the 
steep drop in funding the DoD is facing in today’s acquisition environment, which means 
increasing pressure on current programs, forcing them to perform efficiently and effectively 
with the funds that they manage. 
While cost growth has historically been a burden on DoD funds, the increased 
scrutiny and oversight on budget and performance increases the necessity of more reliable 
cost estimates and tighter management of program cost growth.  
DoD budgets are based on program inputs, and resources are planned and allocated 
accordingly. When these costs become unreliable due to cost growth, future budgets must 
adjust for the increased cost, constraining the flexibility of decision makers.  Ultimately, as 
programs struggle to compete for limited resources to cover growing costs, the warfighter 
suffers from lost capability that cannot be funded, or must delay until further resources are 
available.  Therefore, enhancing the ability of programs to predict, identify, and manage 
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cost growth can allow for a more accurate management of resources and, in turn, likely 
reduce the need for unidentified resources in the future. This presents the DoD with the task 
of grasping a firm understanding of how cost growth behaves throughout a programs 
lifecycle, how to mitigate it when possible, and how to manage it when present.  
 
 
Figure 1: DoD Budget by Funding Account 
Problem Statement 
Historical performance of DoD programs shows that initial estimates are often over-
optimistic compared to final program costs.  In most circumstances, the initial estimate is 
constructed and baselined at Milestone B, when programs first become a program of record.  
The difficulty in estimating here is the multitude of changes a program will undergo over 
the course of its post-Milestone B lifecycle.  It has been called to attention that even after 
accounting for uncertainty in their cost estimates, the official estimate is often looked at as a 
3  
point estimate with little to no consideration for a change in trajectory, and no indication of 
uncertainty in the eventual budget process (DeNeve et al. 2015). This opens the flood gates 
for cost growth when comparing actuals back to this initial baselined estimate.  So while the 
cost estimator is often burdened with the responsibility of accurate cost estimating, they are 
often an easy target to blame when cost growth goes rogue.    
The GAO report in 2009 made waves when they reported the change to total 
acquisition cost from first estimate is 26%.  This number is staggering, when you realize the 
planned commitments were at $1.6 trillion (GAO, 2009).  However, cost growth studies 
have shown the figure to realistically be upwards of 50% (Arena et al., 2006).  IDA and 
RAND both compiled studies in attempt to capture the full extent of cost growth over a 
program’s lifecycle.  These studies both showed more realistic cost growth estimates were 
45 and 46% respectively (Cancian, 2010).  While the cost estimating career field has 
expanded its role in recent years, the challenges that come with the nature of the unknown 
make accurate cost estimating a difficult task. If the strength of initial program estimating 
accuracy cannot necessarily be improved, monitoring the patterns of cost growth becomes 
increasingly important.  
Common issues that typically lead to cost growth are unclear or undefined 
requirements, schedule delays, and technological complexity. Since it is unrealistic to 
assume all cost growth can be prevented and eliminated, helping management accurately 
forecast how cost growth affects the overall cost can be a valuable tool in early 
identification and risk reduction. Porter et al. (2009) describe one of the primary causes of 
cost growth to be weakness in management visibility, direction and oversight.  Part of this 
remains due to the limited tenure of management personnel, and the nonstop rotation of 
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decision makers.  Often times decision makers are focused on the here and now, instead of 
the program completion that may be 10-15 years down the road.  When problems are 
outside of the scope of their term, management can “kick the can” for a while.  However, if 
decision makers have cost growth data that can be applied longitudinally throughout the 
entire lifecycle of a program, it becomes a more relevant part in the acquisition 
environment.  Instead of accepting a “rule of thumb” figure for overall cost growth, using 
this research to help segment cost growth into short-term sections, makes the management 
oversight firsthand and something that decision makers can actively engage in real-time cost 
growth management.   
As subsequent chapters explain, this research identifies the pattern of cost growth 
over the life of a program. In addition to identifying trends in cost growth, this research 
develops statistical guidelines of how cost growth may react given previous performance at 
specified milestones, enabling managers to more accurately predict future program cost 
growth levels.   
Research Objectives and Scope 
The objective of this research is to provide a tool for program managers and decision 
makers to determine where cost growth levels will project, given cost growth incurred 
during previous program milestones achieved. This research culminates in a color coding 
system to help identify cost growth risk, and identifies significant predictor variables for 
each color rating identifier.  
For the scope of this analysis, 36 Aircraft programs across DoD are examined and 
their cost growth performance is evaluated across 4 critical evaluation points between the, 
initial Development Estimate (DE) at Milestone B and the final or most Current Estimate 
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(CE) available. Cost growth is measured by the cost growth factor (CGF), better defined as 
the ratio of actual cost to the estimated costs. When the CGF calculated is greater than 1.0, 
it indicates cost growth from the original estimate, an undesirable direction for the DoD 
program.  Each program is evaluated at these specified program review points, and the CGF 
is documented accordingly. These trends are then mapped to a color rating system, which is 
defined in Chapter III.  
Research Questions 
This research is focused on addressing to major research questions. 
1. How does cost growth behave differently between a segmented longitudinal 
perspective and a traditional lifecycle perspective? 
2. What significant predictor variables forecast a given program review cost growth 
position? 
To address these questions, an analysis of trends and traits of programs is conducted to find 
associated cost growth, to help identify causes associated with cost growth, and to project 
their impact on future performance.  This research identifies targets, in which given a 
current state of cost growth, will provide a benchmark of ranges to predict the future state of 
a program’s cost growth.  This tool ultimately helps leadership identify where program cost 
growth will lie at the next major evaluation point, given current program cost growth levels 
incurred to date.   
Methodology 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) outline a program’s current state and report 
current funding estimates and actual expenses incurred for Major Defense Acquisition 
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Programs (MDAPs). This data is reported annually and provides insights into program 
performance at key milestones. For this study, SARs are used to reference program cost 
estimates and incurred expenses at selected dates. The SAR data used was collected directly 
from Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), and also 
referenced from a database compiled by RAND, based on SAR data.    
This research uses the data collected from the SARs to conduct an analysis on cost 
growth trends.  First, a general analysis of the descriptive statistics is profiled on the data.  
This lays the groundwork for the analysis and helps to define the scope of the profiles.  
Next, the CGF is calculated, and a stoplight color rating system is developed to categorize 
cost growth factors in to easily identifiable risk categories that management can reference 
for top-level reviews.  Once this color rating system is developed, it is applied to each CGF 
calculated.  Finally, the color ratings are analyzed in relationship to each variable identified 
and tested for significance.   
Assumptions/Limitations 
Potential limitations include differing definitions of key milestones between 
programs assessed. In particular, IOC can be measured differently by each independent 
program. In this case, the data as reported in the SAR was used without altering the dates to 
standardize definitions.  Other limitations include missing data within SARs such as 
missing program view dates, limited availability of SARS prior to the implementation of 
DAMIR in 1997, and a small sample size of aircraft programs meeting the appropriate 
criteria for this research.    
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Summary 
Knowing cost growth is a certainty of Defense programs, the ability to capture the 
future cost growth into percentage brackets related to current performance levels may 
provide program leadership the opportunity to adequately prepare for future performance 
milestones.  Instead of looking at long-term cost growth on a total program perspective, this 
research lays the foundation for new cost growth calculations, taking a more short-term 
decision making approach into consideration.  Because management is not always 
concerned with long-term progress, but rather the near term and close range decisions at 
hand, having cost growth broken down into more manageable reviews should help aid 
decision makers. 
The remaining chapters that follow discuss the Literature Review, Methodology, 
Analysis, Results, and Conclusion/Discussion.  The literature review in Chapter II explores 
how cost growth is defined for this study, previous studies on cost growth relevant to this 
research, followed by a model on projected cost growth brackets.  Chapter III walks through 
the creation of a cost database and the subsequent tests conducted in the analysis.  Key 
analysis tests conducted include Contingency Table analysis and Fisher’s Exact Test for 
significance.  These combine to make the foundation for Chapter IV, where the results of 
the analysis conducted are presented.  Finally, Chapter V provides the conclusions of this 
research, as well as recommended future areas of study.
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II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a foundation for this research.  First, the method DoD uses to 
define cost growth is discussed and historical performance is evaluated.  Previous studies on 
DoD cost growth are reviewed for foundational knowledge on cost growth.  Additionally, the 
literature review looks at statistical techniques used to evaluate cost growth.  Lastly, this review 
looks at studies with a longitudinal approach to cost growth in order to identify how cost growth 
can be segmented, and identify potential areas of information in need of further study. 
Cost Growth 
With budgets being stressed by increasing requirements and demands, programs have 
been forced to evaluate funding stressors. Therefore, there is increasing pressure to identify and 
reduce cost growth both at the contract and program level. Oftentimes, programs may not be able 
to reduce the cost growth. However, it can still be useful for a program to be able to accurately 
project where the cost growth is headed in the future and allow for decision makers to adequately 
prepare in advance of the next milestone. This research evaluates the probability of a program to 
fall into a certain cost growth bracket given its current performance cost growth level. 
Cost growth can be interpreted or perceived in a variety of ways, particularly depending 
on the intent of the analysis. The simple answer is that cost growth, in its essence, is when 
something costs more than expected.  However, cost growth can be a combination of a multitude 
of factors. The Select Acquisitions Report (SAR) is the foundational document used to assess 
cost growth on DoD programs, and is the official reporting document used by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO). The SAR divides cost growth in to seven main factors; Economic, 
Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Other, and Support (Cancian, 2010).  
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Economic cost growth is most easy to distinguish, as this is cost growth caused by 
inflation. Inflation is the general increase in prices of goods in the economy, making it external 
to the control of the program. Therefore, for most analyses of cost growth, it is removed. While it 
may appear that the cost of a program is getting more expensive throughout the life of the 
program, adjusting to base year dollars will remove the effect of inflationary increases, allowing 
a more accurate depiction of true program cost growth. 
The cost growth caused by changes in quantity can also distort the perception of program 
costs rising. Although overall program costs may appear to increase, if quantities are increased, 
the true cost per item may not. While some may argue it is still cost growth, given the program is 
costing more than originally projected, for this research changes in quantity are accounted for to 
eliminate artificial cost growth.    
While inflation and quantity are relatively easy to separate out for the purposes of 
analyses, the remaining factors are inherently more subjective. These remaining factors are all 
considered cost growth internal to the program and are the essence of data evaluated in this 
research. It is these decisions between Milestone B and the current estimate that create the 
pattern of longitudinal cost growth that is evaluated for inherent patterns in performance.    
Previous Research Findings – Foundational Analysis 
Once cost growth is defined, it can then be relatively measured. Many studies have 
looked at the cost growth issue within the DoD due to its pervasive nature.  However, different 
approaches have been used to assess and predict cost growth trends.  This section of the literature 
review highlights cost growth research that used as a foundation for this research.   
Drezner et al. (1993) studied CGFs of weapon systems in order to quantify the magnitude 
of cost growth, and identify factors that affect it.  Drezner et al. (1993) found that inflation and 
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quantity have the greatest effect on reported cost growth outcomes, but could be accounted for.  
After removing the effects of both factors, program size and maturity are the two factors that 
have the greatest effect on total program cost growth; smaller programs tend to incur higher cost 
growth, while on average, maturity adds 2.2% above inflation per year (Drezner, 1993).  Drezner 
et al. (1993) validates that historic trends shows cost growth averages about 20%, and has not 
seen significant fluctuations from that over the course of decades.     
Drezner et al. (1993) assessed factors that affect cost growth, discovering that programs 
with prototyping incurred higher cost growth.  This is validated in our research findings in 
Chapter IV.  One explanation for this may be that prototyping tends to be present in programs 
with higher technical uncertainty, which are inherently subject to higher cost growth (Drezner, 
1993).  This research provided a foundation for the need to adjust for inflation and quantity 
changes, as well as account for prototyping as a variable.   
Sipple et al. (2004) compiled a documentation of significant cost growth literature, to 
highlight the variety of statistical methods applied to cost growth in DoD acquisition.  The 
analysis included a study on seven significant cost growth studies, compiled to summarize 
significant findings for cost professionals.  This research served as a foundation of historical cost 
growth overviews.  
Arena et al. (2006) presented a technical report that evaluated statistically significant 
drivers of cost growth for completed programs with similar complexities to those of the U.S. Air 
Force.  Using data collected from the SAR, the CGFs for 68 completed programs are used in 
analysis.  The data is segmented by funding category, milestone, and commodity type to 
accommodate different approaches in estimating.   
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Arena et al. (2006) observed there is consistent underestimation of cost, a point that is 
reiterated in later research.  However, they continue on to find statistically significant drivers of 
cost growth.  Major findings include that programs with longer duration have greater cost 
growth, that there are no statistically significant differences between the services, and little 
evidence to support that cost growth has improved over time (Arena, 2006).   Additionally, 
significant cost growth occurs at MS II and MS III.  Arena et al. (2006) is significant to this 
research because it presents key drivers of cost growth that help form the selected variables 
tested, as well as provides a rationale for using SARs in data collection.  
Continuing on in research to identify cost growth drivers, Bolton et al. (2008) also 
produced a paper for the RAND Corporation exploring causally oriented variance categories. 
Bolton et al. (2008) defined four different categories of cost variance oriented towards the causes 
of cost growth: errors in estimation and planning, decisions by the government, financial matters, 
and miscellaneous sources, and reclassified the variances in the SARs into said categories. This 
research then evaluated cost growth for development, procurement, and total program, by 
identifying the significant cost drivers in each.  According to this study, total cost growth is 
dominated by decisions, accounting for more than two-thirds of the growth.  This includes 
quantity changes, requirements changes, and schedule changes.   
Bolton et al. (2008) provided the foundation on the importance of quantity changes.  
Most cost growth studies standardize for quantity changes, which eliminates their impact.  
However, this study keeps quantity changes inclusive, stating it is still a factor of cost growth 
and should therefore be measured.  Because of this inclusion, Bolton et al. (2008) were able to 
identify how truly significant the impact of quantity changes is in terms of growth.  In fact, more 
than half of the average procurement cost growth is due to quantity changes (Bolton, 2008).  
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Because of these findings, this research heavily considered leaving the quantity change effect as 
part of the analysis; although the data was ultimately standardized remove those effects.  
Deneve et al. (2015) focuses on the issues with DoD cost estimating instead of post-
estimation drivers, posing the question that perhaps the problem is not the accuracy of the cost 
estimate, but that the estimates are estimating the wrong thing.  Using an interesting analogy of 
cost estimating to hurricane forecasting, Deneve et al. (2015) describe how cost estimates often 
become the “sticker price,” and lose the risk and uncertainty analysis in the translation to the 
budget process.  They follow to create a macro-stochastic estimation model by identifying four 
categorical variables with strong relationships to CGFs: program type, iteration, funding years, 
and number of services.  Deneve et al. (2015) conclude these groupings help predict the total cost 
from the baseline estimate.  This research provided the foundation of issues with cost estimation 
in the DoD, an equal culprit to the cost growth problem. 
Kozlak (2016) serves as a key foundation in this research.  Multiple aspects of Kozlak’s 
work were carried forward for additional study, including the identification of key aircraft 
program reviews and milestones, the objective to calculate CGFs at these reviews, and 
identifying the significant cost drivers that pertain to Aircraft programs.   
Kozlak (2016) evaluated development, procurement, and total cost growth, defining 
median cost growth percentage against median program percent completion.   For example, at 
IOC for procurement, the median percent of program completion is 48% and the median percent 
of total cost growth is 91%.  In evaluating each review point as well as percent complete, Kozlak 
(2016) projected that at a median of 6.5 years after Milestone B, a program sustains 
approximately 91% of the total program cost growth.  Aside from evaluating the performance of 
cost growth along a programs review cycle, Kozlak (2016) used logistic regression to identify 
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individual (x) variables that are predictive of cost growth (y).  The regression results showed 
Bomber, Prototype, and Weapon type to be the most predictive variables of cost growth. 
The literature reviewed form the foundation of cost growth research, define significant 
cost growth drivers, and depict overall trends of cost growth within different segments of the 
DoD.  This research combines the above efforts with a slightly varied approach of looking at cost 
growth from a longitudinal perspective.  That is, how does cost growth behavior change as time 
changes?  This research looks to dissect the life of a program into multiple evaluation points, 
each with its own evaluation factors.  This approach can give leadership increased opportunity to 
evaluate, manage, and plan for cost growth on a more reliable timeline.  While limited, some 
research has been conducted using this longitudinal approach, and is presented in the next 
section.  
Previous Research Findings – Longitudinal Studies 
This research takes the approach of evaluating cost growth on a longitudinal perspective, 
looking at each individual program and its cost growth over time from Milestone B to the Final 
or Current Estimate if still ongoing, which is defined in the SAR. While the research on cost 
growth within the DoD is vast, those that evaluate from a longitudinal perspective are limited. 
The remainder of this section summarizes the key literature on previous longitudinal cost growth 
studies. 
On one end of the longitudinal approach spectrum, research has looked at Earned Value 
Management (EVM) with the intent of locating stabilization of cost growth.  Since the early 
1990’s, the EVM community has adopted what is known as the “stability rule,” from widely 
known Christensen and Payne research (1992). Christensen’s findings show that the Cost 
Performance Index (CPI) commonly stabilizes when the contract is at 20% completion 
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(Christensen and Heise, 1993).  This concept was explored more recently, applying 
Christensen’s concepts of “stability” to more recent DoD data (Petter, 2014).  
Petter (2014) addresses this “stability rule,” indicating that recent research may provide 
contradictory evidence that the CPI does not in fact stabilize at 20% completion.  Petter (2014) 
highlights the vague definition of “stability,” and further summarizes it in to three broad 
categories: range definition, absolute interval definition, and relative interval definition.  These 
three definitions become the basis for Petter’s analysis.  Using a variance analysis, Christensen’s 
“stability rule” was both supported and contradicted, depending on the definition of stability 
used.  With the range definition of stability, the 20% complete “stability rule” is supported, 
whereas either interval stability definitions did not (Petter, 2014).   Petter (2014) then continues 
the research continues to break down a contact’s life-cycle phase: Production or Development.  
Here the longitudinal aspect of the research is shows, though applied to EVM and a contract 
basis, making Petter (2014) both a foundational study, an updated approach to the “stability 
rule,” and a take on the longitudinal approach to cost growth.   
While EVM is a valuable tool, and understanding the CPI and its predictive measures on 
final cost, EVM can be restrictive in that MDAPS are often split into a variety of contracts 
throughout the life of the program. Therefore, the CPI limits measuring and predicting program 
cost growth to only a small portion of the overall cost growth. This can be helpful to short-term 
management of cost growth, but restricts long-term strategic thinking.  
The other spectrum of the longitudinal approach encompasses how cost growth trends 
over the course of history.  Davis et al. (2016) performed one of the most recent evaluations of 
cost growth within DoD MDAP programs. However, their approach to a longitudinal evaluation 
was looking at cost growth rates by year, historically, across the DoD over the last three decades.  
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Davis et al. (2016) used a 5-year moving average of the annual changes to assess patterns of cost 
growth in attempt to model growth.   David et al. (2016) reveal that the pattern of historical cost 
growth partially follows the defense budget, providing a new look at what may drive cost 
growth.  Other results show structural changes and legislation contribute to shifts in growth.  
This approach of longitudinal evaluation shows how the acquisition process, policy reform, and 
the behavior of the defense acquisition system play a role in cost growth trends over time.  While 
individual programs were assessed, they were not evaluated as cost growth independently across 
its own lifespan. 
Our research has shown that the longitudinal approach has looked both from a focused, 
contract specific EVM perspective, as well as a timeline driven, DoD-wide overview.  EVM is 
focused on a contract basis, as EVM only looks at and measures performance on a contract level, 
which can mask deeper issues on a total program level. Many DoD programs are comprised of 
multiple contracts during its lifecycle. While EVM is a valuable tool in tracking performance, the 
complexity of DoD programs and contract structure necessitate the need for research on how a 
program performs over the duration of all contracts.  In contrast, the time-phased approach looks 
at how cost growth has changed within the DoD over time and not necessarily on an individual 
program basis.   
While this “longitudinal” concept has been explored, it leaves gaps in looking at the 
concept specifically applied to an individual program.  This facilitates the need for exploration of 
the longitudinal approach and evaluation of cost growth trends throughout the specified life of 
evaluation.  For this research, the question of how cost growth behaves from a longitudinal 
perspective across the life of the program is examined; more specifically, how is current cost 
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growth a predictor of where cost growth will perform at the next measured milestone and what is 
the relationship of cost growth levels between key performance milestones?   
Summary 
 
The literature review presented information on the sources of cost growth, standard 
methods for estimating that growth, research on when cost growth occurs in weapon systems, and 
potential variables to consider in our research. Chapter III, Methodology, discusses how we 
approach addressing the goals of our research. 
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III. Methodology 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to present the details of data used for analysis in this 
research, as well as the methods used for evaluation.  First, the sources used for data collection 
are discussed.  Next, the compilation and evaluation of the data is explained, followed by the 
method used for data standardization.  Finally, how cost growth is identified and analyzed at 
each program review is discussed. 
Data Collection 
 
In order to analyze program cost growth factors, reliable data that contains program 
review information must be obtained.  In most previous studies pertaining to cost growth, the 
SAR is used as a credible source of data, laying a foundation for the SAR as a reputable 
source.  The SAR is one of the best resources of data for acquisition programs, particularly for 
the data points collected for evaluation within this research.   
For this research, SAR data is utilized for program estimates, key dates, and program 
relevant information.  The primary resource used for SARs is the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), which identifies various data sources that the 
Acquisition community uses to manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and 
Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) programs and is the authoritative source for 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), SAR Baseline, Acquisition Program Baselines (APB), 
MAIS Annual Reports (MAR), MAIS Original Estimates (MAIS OE), and Assessments. 
(DAMIR webpage).   
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Additionally, RAND Corporation has worked extensively with historical SARs, 
compiling the annual reports into a SAR database.  This database, which is built electronically 
using separate Microsoft® Excel sheets per program, proved valuable for this research, 
particularly for years that older SARs were not obtainable in DAMIR. 
While SARs report key program dates, often gaps were left for the specific program 
deliverables tracked for the purposes of this research.  The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency 
(AFCAA) previously compiled a database for the purpose of tracking DoD aircraft programs, 
including information on significant program review dates.  The AFCAA database, RAND 
database, and DAMIR portal were combined to provide the information needed for analysis.  
Data Summary 
 
Cost growth is seen across programs of all types, in all services, and in many varying 
degrees.  However, the complexities of DoD acquisition make normalizing program 
milestones across different services difficult, creating incompatibilities in evaluation.  
Therefore, this research focuses only on aircraft programs within the DoD.  Furthermore, the 
analysis is limited to only Acquisition Category 1 (ACAT 1) programs, since the reporting 
requirements for SAR do not extend to lower value thresholds.  ACAT 1 programs are Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), estimated to require eventual expenditure for 
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), including all planned increments, of 
more than $480 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 14 constant dollars, or procurement, including all 
planned increments, of more than $2.79 billion (FY 2014 constant dollars) (DAU, 2015).  
Once the given criteria are applied to the SAR database, 36 DoD Aircraft programs are 
captured for evaluation.  Table 1 lists the programs used for analysis in this research.  
19 
 
Table 1: Aircraft Programs Selected for Analysis 
 
Limitations 
The collection of data within the DoD, particularly with respect to the acquisition 
environment, is in and of itself a proven challenge.  While in theory the DoD has an 
acquisition process to guide key reporting dates and decisions, in practice many programs 
deviate from this standard process.  It therefore becomes difficult to create a standard set of 
variables and tracking measures that are consistent enough across the population to perform a 
thorough analysis.  While ideally this research method could be applied to a variety of 
programs, both aircraft and otherwise, the lack of common review points for measurement 
makes the application difficult.  Therefore, this study is limited to aircraft-only programs.  
This research also heavily relies on the data contained within the SAR for each 
program, which has limitations of its own.  Many previous studies, including Kozlak (2016), 
Arena et al. (2006), and Hough (1992) have discussed limitations surrounding the SAR.  The 
key limitations that are relevant to this study are summarized here.  
  
 A-10  C-27J  F-35
 AV-8B  E-2C  RQ-4 
 B-1A  E-2D  MQ-4C
 B-1B  E-6A  P-8A
 B-1B CMUP  EA-18G  S-3A
 B-1B JDAM  EF-111  T-6 (JPATS)
 B-2 RMP  FA-18EF  T-45TS
 C-130 AMP  F-14A  V-22 FSD
 C-17A  F-14D  F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
 C-5 AMP  F-15  KC-46
 C-5 RERP  F-16  MQ-1C
 C-5B  F-22  Reaper
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1. High–Level Data.  While useful for obtaining dates and estimate information, SAR 
does not provide in-depth explanations for said data.  This means high-level 
assumptions must be made, and critical details may be overlooked.  
2. Reporting Guidelines and Requirement Changes.  Over the historical span of SAR 
reporting, many changes have evolved the process.  This leaves room for 
inconsistent comparisons among programs.  Since this study spans the years from 
the 1960’s on, it is particularly susceptible to this limitation. 
3. Lack of Risk and Confidence Levels.  Without this information, the estimates 
contained in the SAR are taken at face value.  If an estimate contains a significant 
amount of associated risk, it may not be a valid representation of true program cost.  
4. Each program creates its SAR for reporting.  Since each individual program is 
responsible for populating and submitting a SAR, each SAR will be unique.  This 
makes it difficult for comparison to other programs and virtually impossible for an 
apples to apples analysis.  
Also, DAMIR, while a valuable resource for collecting SAR data, only contains reports 
post-1997.  Prior SAR copies have not been electronically converted into the system, making 
information hard to locate on older acquisition programs.  While the RAND database was 
validated against information on DAMIR for post-1997 SARS, older programs were unable to 
be verified.  It is therefore an assumption of this research that the RAND database is accurate 
in its information collection and conversions.  Given there were no errors detected in programs 
that could be verified on DAMIR, it is a reasonable assumption that the RAND database is 
accurate for evaluation. 
In spite of the limitations within the SAR, its historical use in cost growth studies and 
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relatively stable capture of vital information make it a reasonable source of information for 
this analysis.  
Another limitation is the assumption that this research and the results that follow may be 
subject to a Type I error; that is, the incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis.  Even though 
this research is exploratory in nature and uses an alpha value of 0.10, the volume of variables 
tested (720 total combinations) presents a much narrower window of significance.  Therefore, 
while it is likely the top variables noted play some important role, the level of true significance 
is unknown until further research can be conducted.  However, even with the knowledge of a 
possible Type I error, the general purpose of this research is to find general trends in 
longitudinal cost growth and meets that goal accordingly.  
Data Set and Predictor Variables 
 
In order to evaluate cost growth patterns across a program lifespan, key program dates, 
all encompassed by the Milestone B estimate and the Last Reported SAR (LRS) were selected.  
Each key date represents a new bracket of evaluation.  These dates, subsequent to the 
development estimate at Milestone B, are used to track how cost growth moves across the 
longitudinal span of the program, relating each to its predecessor evaluation point, as well as the 
DE.  The research of Kozlak (2016) identified four key dates critical to the evaluation of DoD 
Aircraft cost growth between Milestone B and LRS.  As such, the same program events are 
used for the purposes of this research, to include: 
1. Development Estimate point (Milestone B) 
2. Critical Design Review (CDR) 
3. First Flight (FF) 
4. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 
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5. Initial Operating Capability (IOC) 
6. Final Estimate or Last Reported SAR (LRS) 
For each program review point, the Current Estimate is considered the estimate provided in the 
SAR for the year in which the review point occurred.   
 In addition to the date and estimate value at each program review, other program 
information is captured by for analysis.  The following predictor variables considered for 
evaluation of program cost growth are listed and described as follows: 
• Air Force – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the aircraft is developed for the Air Force.  
 
• Navy – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the aircraft is developed for the Navy.  
 
• Pre-1997 BY – Binary Variable 
o This dummy variable identifies if the base year evaluated occurs before 
1997.  The year 1997 identifies the point in which SAR information 
becomes available electronically within DAMIR. 
  
• Prototype – Binary Variable 
o This variable represents programs that create a prototype, or prototypes, 
of a weapons system before production of that weapons system begins. 
More than one type of prototype for a weapons system can be created in 
a given program. 
 
• Modification – Binary Variable 
o This variable is concerned with programs whose existence serves as a 
modification to a pre-existing weapons system.  
 
• Small Program – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B) 
is considered “small.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.  
 
• Medium Program – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B) 
is considered “medium.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.  
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• Large Program – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B) 
is considered “large.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.  
 
• Duration <180 (Months) – Binary Variable 
o This variable indicates if the program length from CA-LRS was less than 
180 months.  The 180 month period was determined a significant break in 
contract length when all programs were evaluated on a distribution analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Distinction of Cost Growth Program Size 
 
Other variables are present in the database for program information and reference; 
however, they were not included in tested variables for the purposes of this study.  These 
variables include: 
 
• Contractor – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies which contractor is responsible for the program 
development.  If a contractor only appeared once, it was identified in 
the “Other” variable.   
 
Given the very small sample size and the wide mix of contractors, this variable is likely a weak 
predictor for this analysis. 
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• Quantity – Continuous Variable 
o This variable reports the quantity predicted at the time of the program 
review.  
 
Quantity is used to calculate the estimate/quantity factor to standardize the CGF.  However, it 
is not tested as a variable.  
• Percent complete – Continuous Variable 
o This variable measures the cost spent to date compared to the estimate 
value in the Last Reported SAR. 
 
This is a common variable when evaluating cost growth.  Percent complete is calculated based 
on the actual cost to date as a percentage of estimate at LRS.  However, due to the 
inconsistencies of actual costs reported and the limitations of the SAR, this variable is limited 
in integrity, and is left out accordingly as a predictor variable for this analysis.  
Estimating Cost Growth 
 
To assess cost growth, this study evaluates what is referred to as a Cost Growth Factor 
(CGF).  This is the calculation of current estimate as it relates to a previous, or  
original baseline, estimate.  The CGF method divides the estimate plus the cost variance 
(actual) by the estimate (Drezner et al., 1993) 
The neutral state of a CGF is where actuals equal the estimate, returning a value of 1.0.  
This indicates there has been no program cost growth.  When the CGF is greater than 1.0, the 
program actuals are higher than the estimate, showing that there has been cost growth sustained 
by the program.  Conversely, a CGF less than 1.0 indicates that the current cost of the program 
is less than the estimate, or a projected cost-underrun.  To calculate the percent cost growth, 
subtract 1 from the cost growth factor (Drezner et al., 1993)
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A program carries multiple estimates over its lifecycle.  First, a Planning Estimate 
(PE) is the estimate made during the Concept Exploration and Definition stage.  Because 
this estimate is prior to Milestone B, it is not referenced for analysis in this research.  The 
Development Estimate (DE), often referred to as a baseline estimate, occurs at Milestone B 
and is used as the foundational estimate in this research. Finally, the Current Estimate (CE) 
is the most up to date estimate. If a program is complete, the CE is the actual cost of the 
program (Calcutt, 1993). 
Estimators calculate cost growth from a baseline estimate, the PE, DE, or CE. 
Typically, the DE at MS B is the baseline estimate for cost growth. MS B is the point in the 
schedule where a program enters full-scale development and officially becomes a 
“program of record.” Once a program of record is established, the program is required to 
file official cost reports with Congress (Porter et al., 2009). As formal cost reports 
materialize, cost growth becomes easier to track, and for this reason, the estimator 
measures cost growth from the DE when possible. 
Data Standardization 
 
The quantities each aircraft program produces typically shift both upwards and 
downwards throughout the stages of a program’s lifecycle. Accounting for this change is a 
contested topic in terms of cost growth.  The argument presents two ways: Cost growth 
associated with change in quantity is still cost growth that needs to be measured, and cost 
growth associated with change in quantity needs to be standardized to view cost growth 
inherent to the system.  For this research, the cost growth factor is standardized to account 
for any change in quantity.  SARs list the quantities estimated and produced for each 
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aircraft program. In order to standardize the cost growth factor for quantity, a cost per 
aircraft is calculated at each program review point.  This amount is then used in the 
calculation of the cost growth factor.   
In addition to quantity, the database is standardized for consistent Base Year (BY) 
reporting. While not all 36 programs are evaluated in the same BY, each individual 
program maintains a common Base Year across each review point, making comparison of 
cost growth consistent.  Since the comparison is from within each program and not across 
all programs, it is not necessary to convert all programs to the same BY.  In most cases, 
the BY is the original year in which the program was estimated.  In some cases, however, 
the BY was updated at some point throughout the life of the program.  In these instances, 
the most recent BY is applied across all review points.   
Cost Growth 
 
Once the cost per aircraft at each program review is calculated, the cost growth 
factor for a variety of combinations is found in order to evaluate the cost growth from a 
longitudinal perspective.  This combination of interlocking cost growth evaluation is what 
distinguishes this research from cost growth research in the past.  Each combination of 
cost growth factors is evaluated in order to present a tool of identification for cost growth 
management.  Table 2 shows the combinations of cost growth evaluated.  Each 
relationship is assigned a number for analysis naming purposes and is identified to the 
right of the relationship title. 
In Tier I, relationships 1-5, the overall cost growth incurred from Contract Award 
to each subsequent program review is evaluated.  Tier I measures cost growth while 
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holding the first review point of Contract Award constant. More specifically, the first 
evaluation point measured is Contract Award to Critical Design review, while the last 
cost growth factor in this tier represents total growth from Contract Award to Last 
Reported SAR.  
Table 2: Review Relationship Tiers 
 
Secondary evaluation includes program review combinations noted in Tier II, 
relationship numbers 6, 10, 13, and 15.  Relationship 1 is also re-considered as a part of 
Tier II analysis.  This tier is depicting the cost growth at each longitudinal cross section, 
as the program moves through the lifecycle.  Instead of the overall cost growth measured 
in Tier I, dissecting the program down to each intermittent phase of the program lifecycle 
can help to show a more definitive image of how cost growth behaves at subsections of 
Tier I
Contract Award - Critical Design Review (1)
Contract Award - First Flight (2)
Contract Award - Development Test & Evaluation (3)
Contract Award - Initial Operating Capability (4)
Contract Award - Last Reported SAR (5)
Tier II
Critical Design Review - First Flight (6)
First Flight - Development Test & Evaluation (10)
Development Test & Evaluation - Initial Operating Capability (13)
Initial Operating Capability - Last Reported SAR (15)
Tier III
Critical Design Review - Development Test & Evaluation (7)
Critical Design Review - Initial Operating Capability (8)
Critical Design Review - Last Reported SAR (9)
First Flight - Initial Operating Capability (11)
First Flight - Last Reported SAR (12)
Development Test & Evaluation - Last Reported SAR (14)
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the program.  Tier II is the focus of management decision making tools provided in this 
research. 
Finally, Tier III combinations are evaluated showing remaining combinations of 
phases.  While this research focuses primarily on results from Tier I and Tier II, Tier III is 
used for further analysis and confirmation of suspected indicators. 
Color Coding Cost Growth 
A stoplight chart is a color coded decision tool that helps quickly identify project 
status and risk levels using visual aids.  Typically, Green, Amber, and Red are used to 
indicate the status of a program.  However, subjectivity is involved in defining the 
conditions as to what constitutes red, green, or amber status, and must be rationally 
defined.  For the purposes of this research, a distribution summary of cost growth factors 
is evaluated for color break points.  A review of the distribution of CGFs for each of the 
15 program review relationships, as well as the overall distribution, is analyzed for logical 
divisions.  Figure 3 shows the distribution analysis for Contract Award-Critical Design 
Review as an example of the distribution breakout.  The other distribution summaries can 
be found in Appendix A. 
Green indicates low to no risk and identifies programs that incur a CGF of 1.0 or 
less.  As previously indicated, this means that the actuals are at or below the estimated 
value.  Amber signifies the program has encountered some risk, but is not yet in jeopardy 
of serious trouble.  Programs that fall in this category are highlighted for extra attention 
and scrutiny, but are still within the range of correction.  This research shows that 
programs stay moderately stable up until the 10% cost growth range; therefore, Amber 
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coded programs are defined as those which encounter cost growth ranging from 1.0 to 
1.10.  After 10%, cost growth starts to vary widely with large inconsistencies and 
predictabilities.  Therefore, a CGF that lies above 1.10 is identified as Red.  
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution Used for Color Rating Assignment 
Following the categorized levels identified for each color, the CGF at each Tier 
and Tier sub-section is allocated to its respective color rating in order to assign a risk 
level color for that section’s cost growth.  This adds the response variables to the 
database.  The following variables are now incorporated for analysis:  
 
• Green – Binary Variable 
o This variable identifies if the analyzed CGF falls at 1.0 or below.  
 
• Amber – Binary Variable 
o This variable indicates if the CGF falls between the range  
 1.0 < CGF ≤ 1.10.  
 
• Red– Continuous Variable 
o This variable indicates if the CGF is > 1.10. 
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This step is captured for each of the 15 program review relationships identified 
above in Table 2.  The first relationship is identified as Green/Amber/Red, while the 
second relationship is identified by Green2/Amber2/Red2.  This identification helps 
subsequent analysis between different program review points.  In addition to the evaluation 
of the CGF between each of the six program review points (totaling the 15 relationships), 
the assigned color at each review point for each relationship is compared to look for trends 
in programs across their lifecycle.  For example, if a program is Green at the first program 
review, is it more likely to be Green at evaluation point 2?  This analysis reviews each 
combination of factors to help provide insight to longitudinal cost growth behavior 
patterns.  
Two-Way Contingency Tables 
This research focuses on multinomial experiments looking for significant 
relationships with respect to two qualitative factors.  Each combination of factors present 
in the database are compared in order to distinguish the most statistically significant 
relationships in a program lifecycle that helps to predict the color status of a program at 
any given review point.  Among the 15 program review relationships, 720 
predictor/response combinations are tested for independence.  Table 3 shows the predictor 
variables and response variable combinations that are tested in this research.  Only valid 
relationships are denoted by a “1”.  Relationships not indicated by a “1” are those in which 
the predictor variable is not applicable to the response variable.  For instance, Green 
cannot predict a response of Green; therefore, no relationship is present and no “1” is 
denoted. 
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Table 3: Predictor and Response Variable Combinations 
The method of analysis used is a contingency table (also known as a cross 
tabulation or crosstab) to look for independence among variables.  A contingency table 
displays the frequency distribution of the variables. They are heavily used in survey 
research because they provide a basic picture of the interrelation between two variables.  
Table 4 shows a basic summary of a contingency table between two variables, A and B.  
For each variable there are two responses. A response of “no” indicates the variable does 
Response AF Navy Pre97 Post97 Prototype Mod Small Meduim Large <180 mo G A R G6 A6 R6 G10 A10 R10 G13 A13 R13
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Predictor
32  
not meet the criteria, and a response of “yes” indicates the variable meets the criteria.  For 
each combination of variables A and B, four combinations are possible: 
1. No, No 
2. No, Yes 
3. Yes, No 
4. Yes, Yes 
Each combination is counted, and the count is represented in the table by n11, n12, n22, 
n22, respectively.  The counts are then totaled in each column (C1 and C2) and Row (R1 
and R2), and a total count of observations, n, is determined.  Once each row and column 
is populated, the counts are then compared to expected values and measured for 
independence. 
Table 4: Sample Contingency Table 
 
Fisher’s Exact Test  
To assess the significance of the contingency table, a P-value is calculated.  A 
variety of methods can be used in calculating a P-value.  Due to the small sample size of 
this research, Fisher’s Exact Test is used.  Fisher’s Exact Test is a statistical test used to 
determine if there are nonrandom associations between two categorical variables drawn 
from calculated contingency tables.  Apart from other significance tests available, a 
benefit of using Fisher’s Exact Test is that it does not estimate the probability of a value; 
No Yes Totals
No n11 n12 R1
Variable A Yes n21 n22 R2
Totals C1 C2 n
Variable B
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rather the test calculates the exact probability of receiving the observed data (Kozlak, 
2016).  While the test is available for any sample size, it is particularly useful when 
sample sizes are small, as other applicable tests are limited.  Although the total sample 
size used in this study is 36 programs, each combination of variables results in many 
cases where there is an even smaller sample set. This makes Fisher’s Exact Test an 
acceptable measure for independence between a program having defined color rating and 
the explanatory variables considered in this thesis.   
To understand Fisher’s Exact Test, two assumptions are necessary.  The first 
assumption is that all observations are independent. Second, the test operates under fixed, 
or conditioned, row and column totals. This second assumption is what distinguishes 
Fisher’s Exact Test from other statistical independence tests with unconditioned rows and 
columns (McDonald, 2009).   
The results of Fisher’s Exact Test produce both a 1-tailed and a 2-tailed 
hypothesis test.   The 1-tailed test uses a single tail of the probability distribution (either 
left tail, or right), and examines changes in a single direction.  The hypothesis for a 1-
tailed test is: 
• Ho: the factors are the same 
 
• Ha: the probability the color rating is greater for the factor = ‘1’ than ‘0’ 
(right tailed) 
 
• Ha: the probability the color rating is greater for the factor = ‘0’ than ‘1’ 
(left tailed) 
 
The 2-tailed test uses both tails of a probability distribution (both right and left) 
and examines changes in both directions.  The hypothesis for a 2-tailed test is: 
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• Ho: the factors are the same 
 
• Ha: the factors are not the same 
 
This research uses the 1-tailed hypothesis tests to identify if a categorical factor 
increases the likelihood a program will have the tested color rating. The null hypothesis 
states the categorical variable does not affect the color rating.  If the p-value for a right 
sided test is significant, the predictor variable increases the likelihood of the tested 
response color rating.  If the results were significant for the left sided test, the predictor 
variable is less likely to produce the tested response color rating.  
Fisher’s Exact Test is used to look at each categorical predictor variable, identified 
above, against each color rating.  In turn, as the color ratings progress from Green to 
Green2 and forward, the previous color ratings also become tested predictor variables.   
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter details the research methodology used. The collection of data from 
the SAR and DAMIR is described.  Predictor variables that provide a link to the response 
variable were identified and explained. The reasoning for the methodology used is 
provided along with a detailed explanation of the Fisher’s Exact Test for analysis.  The 
next chapter introduces the results to the testing involved in this research, and the analysis 
of findings. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter provides the results from the methodology outlined in Chapter III. 
First, a color code is distinguished for each of the 15 program review relationships. 
Second, an analysis of the specified techniques is conducted on the 720 
predictor/response relationships in the database. The findings are then measured and 
compared. Finally, the details of the significant variables are discussed and summarized.   
Color Rating Summary 
 
The overview of our database revolves around how the risk of cost growth is 
depicted across the program lifecycle.  As discussed in Chapter III, risk levels are defined 
as Green, Amber, or Red, and are applied on a basis of CGF at the given program review 
point.  Each program receives a color rating at each of the 15 relationship points, 
although this research focuses on the results from Tier I and Tier II relationships. Tier III 
findings did not produce results that enhance the longitudinal evaluation, and therefore 
were excluded from analysis.  While the color rating does not tell the complete story, 
which is supported by our further analysis, it does provide a management level overview 
of how cost growth has historically behaved throughout the longitudinal aspect of a 
program.  Table 5 shows the color rating summary for Tier I relationships.  
Table 5 shows how the color rating of a program changes as a program moves 
from Contract Award to each program review point.  It is important to know that these 
relationships depict overall cost growth as they all start at CA and move forward.  While 
this is a good indicator of program health, it is also a commonly studied and traditional 
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view of looking at cost growth.  Therefore, this research breaks down the program 
lifecycle further, reviewing each individual subsection of a program for a more distinct 
picture on the behavior of cost growth, indicated by Tier II relationships.   
Table 5: Tier I Color Rating Summary
 
Tier II relationships take a more in depth view of cost growth, by looking at each 
CGF independently of historical behavior.  Instead of moving from CA forward, Tier II 
only looks at the relationship of a program review cost growth as it relates to the cost 
growth of the preceding review point.  This can help management predict a more short-
Program CA-CDR CA-FF CA-DTE CA-IOC CA-LRS
 A-10
 AV-8B
 B-1A
 B-1B
 B-1B CMUP Computer Upgrade
 B-1B CMUP JDAM
 B-2 RMP
 C-130 AMP
 C-17A
 C-5 RERP
 C-5B
 E-2C
 E-2D
 E-6A
 EA-18G
 EF-111
 FA-18EF
 F-14A
 F-15
 F-16
 F-22
 F-35
 RQ-4 (GLOBAL HAWK)
 MQ-4C
 P-8A
 S-3A
 T-6 (JPATS)
 T-45TS
 V-22 FSD
 F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
 KC-46
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term planning strategy.  While the program may have an overall CGF of red, the near term 
in real-time may have a level or decreasing CGF.  While long-term mitigation may be in 
need, management can strategically plan for real-time responses. Table 6 shows the color 
ratings for Tier II evaluation.   
Table 6: Tier II Color Rating Summary 
 
Tier II CA-CDR CDR-FF FF-DTE DTE-IOC IOC-LRS
 A-10
 AV-8B
 B-1A
 B-1B
 B-1B CMUP Computer Upgrade
 B-1B CMUP JDAM
 B-2 RMP
 C-130 AMP
 C-17A
 C-5 AMP
 C-5 RERP
 C-5B
 E-2C
 E-2D
 E-6A
 EA-18G
 EF-111
 FA-18EF
 F-14A
 F-15
 F-16
 F-22
 F-35
 RQ-4 (GLOBAL HAWK)
 MQ-4C
 P-8A
 S-3A
 T-6 (JPATS)
 T-45TS
 V-22 FSD
 F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
 KC-46
 MQ-1C
 Reaper (block 1)
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 The results in Tier II color rating appear to be more incomplete than Tier I.  This is 
due to the fact that the most common missing date among programs is for CDR.  
Therefore, the first two relationships in Tier II are affected, where in Tier I, only one 
relationship would be affected.  However, even with incomplete data, the results of color 
ratings for Tier II show an overall summary that provides significant insight.  Table 6 
shows that cost growth factors rate red significantly less than in Tier I (29 vs. 64).  Also, of 
the 29 red ratings, 13 (45%) occur during FF-DTE (relationship 10).  Even before running 
contingency tables and Fisher’s Exact Test, this shows strong support that not only is the 
CGF significantly different when looking at a program from a longitudinal perspective 
versus a lifecycle perspective, the primary driver of high CGF is the Development Test and 
Evaluation phase.  This insight can help decision makers plan best for mid-program cost 
increases, while avoiding over-anticipation of program end turmoil.  
 The color rating assignment and comparison paves the way for further analysis.  
Now that an overall picture is painted, we dive further by running contingency tables 
between the 720 combinations of variables, in order to best determine what are strong 
predictors of the defined color rating at each given review point.  While we evaluate 720 
relationships across the 15 stated relationships, this research focuses on those within Tier I 
and Tier II. 
Tier I Results 
 
Tier I contingency tables test every nominal variable against each of the 15 color 
ratings within Tier I relationships (Green through Red5).  As previously mentioned, Tier I 
shows overall cost growth as a program moved from Contract Award to each review 
point of the lifecycle.  For each contingency table evaluated, a Fisher’s Exact Test value 
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is compared to an alpha value of α = 0.10.  This section walks through the significant 
findings within Tier I, focusing on the five most significant dependencies, and 
summarizing the remaining significant findings.  A general analysis summarizes our Tier 
I findings before the discussion of Tier II examination. 
Green3 given Green2 
 The most significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Green3 (CA-DTE) given 
Green2 (CA-FF).  Figure 4 shows the contingency table results for this analysis.  While it 
seems fairly logical that if a program is Green at one evaluation point, it is more likely to 
be Green at the second evaluation point, this relationship is extremely significant, with 
the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0001 (Table 7).   
 
Figure 4: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green3 Given Green2 
Table 7: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Green3 Given Green2 
 
The contingency table in Table 8 shows the expected count of programs being 
green at both points is roughly 2.5 whereas this analysis encountered 7 programs.  It is 
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also important to note that Green3 encompasses DTE, which is the area of most 
significant cost growth in a program.  Therefore, this finding is valuable to management 
and decision makers, in that if a program is still maintaining a Green color rating at FF, it 
is very likely that it will complete DTE with minimal cost growth.  
Table 8: Contingency Table for Green3 Given Green2 
 
Maintaining Green at point 3 could be a critical factor in a program’s decision 
structure and funding profile.  This relationship shows management that efforts to 
maintain a Green rating at FF can truly impact its overall CGF.   This may aid pushing 
management to make early investments to mitigate cost growth, as it provides the most 
return on investment.  
Red5 given Red3 
In contrast to the results provided above in the first analysis, the second most 
significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Red5 (CA-LRS) given Red3 (CA-DTE).  
Figure 5 shows the contingency table results for this dependency.  Following the logic 
that a Green rating early on will aid long term Green status, this relationship shows that 
hitting a Red rating early on will ultimately push the program into Red status for the long 
haul.  This relationship is highly significant, with the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 
0.0002 (Table 9).   
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Figure 5: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red5 Given Red3 
 
Table 9: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Red3 
 
The contingency table in Table 10 shows the expected count of programs being 
Red at both points is roughly 11.3 whereas this analysis encountered 16 programs that 
completed LRS in a Red rating.  It is also important to highlight, that of the 17 programs 
that were rated Red at DTE, 16 of them continued to rate Red at LRS.  This is a 
significant indicator to management as to where the program is headed if cost growth is 
out of control by DTE. 
The first two dependencies analyzed highlight the importance of program status as 
of DTE, providing further encouragement for decision makers to invest early in mitigating 
cost growth drivers.    
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Table 10: Contingency Table for Red5 Given Red3 
 
Red5 given Green3 
Further supporting the first two analyses, the relationship between Red5 (CA-LRS) 
and Green3 (CA-DTE) is also statistically significant.  While the analysis of Red5 given 
Red3 indicated a high likelihood that a program is Red at DTE will stay Red at LRS, the 
Red5 given Green3s relationship shows that Green at DTE makes it unlikely a program 
will be Red at LRS.  Figure 6 shows the contingency table results for this analysis.  The 
Fisher’s Exact Test shows a P-Value of 0.0017 (Table 11); however this is a left sided 
result, showing that it is less likely to return a “1” at Red 5 than 0.  
 
Figure 6: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red5 Given Green3 
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Table 11: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Green3 
 
The contingency table in Table 12 shows the expected count of programs being 
Red at LRS given Green at DTE to be approximately 4.7.  However, of the 7 programs 
that had a rating of Green at DTE, only 1 encountered a rating of Red at LRS.  This is 
even further validation that strong control of cost growth early can minimize the risk of 
extensive cost growth throughout the entire program lifecycle.   
Table 12: Contingency Table for Red5 Given Green3 
 
 The top three significant relationships all return with a commonality; DTE 
indicating a very relevant target for programs in terms of cost growth management.   
Green5 given Modification 
The fourth result, when ranked by lowest P-value, shows Modification as a 
predictor of Green at review point 5 (CA-LRS).   Figure 7 shows the contingency table 
results for this analysis.  The Fisher’s Exact Test has a P-Value of 0.0017 (Table 13); 
indicating that for Green5, it is more likely for Modification=1 to return a value than 0.  
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Figure 7: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green5 Given Modification 
 
Table 13: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Green3 
 
The contingency table in Table 14 shows that the expected count of programs being 
Green at LRS given the program is a Modification is approximately 3.2.  However, 7 
programs met these criteria.   
Table 14: Contingency Table for Green5 Given Modification 
 
45  
It is also important to note here that a solid color bar appears in the contingency 
table.  This shows that of all programs not coded “Modification,” zero returned a value of 
“1” at LRS.  While not the tested variable, this is extremely important to note for 
management planning purposes, as it indicates there is a very low change of a non-mod 
program ending in a Green rating.  
Red3 given Red2 
 Once again DTE returns to the forefront.  The final significant finding in the top 5 
of Tier I, shows the dependency between Red3 (CA-DTE) and Red2 (CA-FF).  Figure 8 
shows the contingency table results for this analysis.  The Fisher’s Exact Test shows a 
right sided P-Value of 0.0052 (Table 15) depicting that the probability for a Red3 rating 
is greater for Red2=1 than 0.    
 
Figure 8: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red3 Given Red2 
Table 15: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red3 Given Red2 
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The contingency table in Table 16 shows the expected count of programs being 
Red at DTE given the program is Red at FF is approximately 5.7, whereas the analysis 
returned a value of 9.  Also, once again a solid colored bar appears in the contingency 
table.  This is represented by the circumstance that every program that produced a Red 
rating at FF returned a red rating at DTE.  This is perhaps another look at how early cost 
growth performance dictates long-run outcomes. 
Table 16: Contingency Table for Red3 Given Red2 
 
Other Significant Tier I Results 
Of the Tier I relationships tested, 32 flagged as significant dependencies at the 
confidence level α = 0.10. Table 17 shows the remaining 27 significant findings.  Each of 
these findings is sorted by their level of significance, not by the variables impacted.  Also 
noted is the direction of the tail on the test, to define how the relationship is related.   
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Table 17: Other Significant Tier I Results 
 
Tier II Results 
Tier II contingency tables test every nominal variable against each of the 15 color 
ratings within Tier II relationships (relationships 1, 6, 10, 13, and 15).  Unlike Tier I, Tier 
II shows the individual cross sections of the program lifecycle which provides better 
insight into the true behavior of cost growth at each longitudinal section, as opposed to 
the overarching view traditionally taken.  Just as tested in Tier I, for each contingency 
Response Predictor Fishers Exact Test Direction
Red2 Red 0.0055 Right
Green2 Green 0.0065 Right
Green5 Red3 0.0078 Left
Red3 Green2 0.0104 Left
Red5 Modification 0.0131 Left
Red4 Red2 0.0136 Right
Red Large 0.0162 Right
Red2 Prototype 0.0179 Right
Green5 Green2 0.022 Right
Green5 Green3 0.0239 Right
Red5 Green 0.0252 Left
Red2 Medium 0.026 Left
Red5 Red2 0.026 Right
Amber2 Amber 0.0266 Right
Red3 <180 months 0.0311 Left
Green3 Red2 0.0358 Left
Green2 Prototype 0.0396 Left
Green3 Amber2 0.0567 Left
Amber Pre97 0.0749 Left
Amber2 Medium 0.0787 Right
Amber Navy 0.082 Right
Green4 Red2 0.0875 Left
Green4 Red3 0.0907 Left
Red4 Green2 0.0965 Left
Red4 Red3 0.0965 Right
Green Pre97 0.0982 Right
Red2 Large 0.0983 Right
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table evaluated, a Fisher’s Exact Test value is compared to an alpha value of α=0.10.  
This section discusses the significant findings within Tier II, focusing on the five most 
significant dependencies, and summarizing the remaining significant findings.  A general 
analysis summarizes the Tier II findings before the discussion of the overall analysis. 
Amber6 given Amber 
The most significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Amber6 (CDR-FF) given 
Amber (CA-CDR).  Figure 9 shows the contingency table results for this analysis.  This is 
the first appearance of Amber in the analysis, and it consists of not one side, but both 
sides of the dependency.  In Tier I analysis, programs depicted Green or Red much more 
than Amber.  Dissecting the programs on a small scale shows a lot more variability to the 
behavior of the cost growth.  Table 18 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 
0.0100, depicting that the probability for a Amber6 rating is greater for Amber=1 than 0.    
 
Figure 9: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber6 Given Amber 
Table 18: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber6 Given Amber 
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The contingency table in Table 19 shows the expected count of programs being 
Amber from CDR-FF given the program is Amber at CA-CDR, is approximately 3.84.  
The analysis results, however, were nearly double at 7 occurrences.   
Table 19: Contingency Table for Amber6 Given Amber 
 
Green6 given Green 
The second significant finding relates to the dependency of Green6 (CDR-FF) to 
Green (CA-CDR).  This follows similar logic to Tier I results, in that early program cost 
growth mitigation, can aid in future increments.  Figure 10 shows the contingency table 
results for this analysis.  Table 20 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0159 
revealing that the probability of Green6=1 is higher for Green=1 than 0. 
 
Figure 10: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green6 Given Green 
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Table 20: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Green6 Given Green 
 
The contingency table in Table 21 shows the expected count of programs being 
Green during FF-DTE given the program is Green during CA-FF, is approximately 3.96, 
whereas the analysis conducted returned a value of 7.   
Table 21: Contingency Table for Green6 Given Green 
 
Amber13 given Green6 
Result 3 is perhaps one of the most unique seen thus far.  The analysis now breaks 
from traditional Green-Green relationships.  This result highlights the dependency 
between Amber at DTE-IOC and Green at CDR-FF.  Figure 11 shows the contingency 
table results for this analysis.  Table 22 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 
0.0292, revealing that the probability of Amber13=1 is greater for Green=1 than 0. 
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Figure 11: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber13 Given Green6 
 
Table 22: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber13 Given Green6
 
This seems counter-intuitive to previous results in that it indicates programs is 
more likely to experience cost growth rather than sustain lower levels previously 
demonstrated early in the program.  The contingency table (Table 23) shows the expected 
count of a program being Amber during DTE-IOC given the program is Green during 
CDR-FF, is approximately 2.6 whereas the analysis conducted returned a value of 5.   
This appears to be an anomaly to previously discovered trends and is worth noting 
for further research.  Underlying program commonalities need to be investigated to 
understand this relationship.  However, it is a striking discovery, further validating the 
need for longitudinal review of data.  Patterns like this aren’t apparent when looking at 
cost growth from a whole-program perspective.  
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Table 23: Contingency Table for Amber13 Given Green6 
 
Red6 given Red 
The next significant relationship reverts back to traditional patterns revealing a 
dependency between Red6 (CDR-FF) and Red (CA-CDR).  Figure 12 shows the 
contingency table results for this analysis.  Table 24 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact 
Test at 0.0312, revealing that the probability of Red6=1 is greater for Red=1 than 0. 
The contingency table in Table 25 shows the expected count of a program being 
Red during CDR-FF given the program is Red during CA-CDR is 0.96, or almost 1.  
However, of the 4 programs that are rated Red at CA-CDR, 3 remain red at CDR-FF.  
 
 
Figure 12: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red6 Given Red 
 
53  
Table 24: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red6 Given Red
 
Table 25: Contingency Table for Red6 Given Red 
 
Amber10 given Small 
To round out the strongest five relationships in Tier II, program size finally makes 
an impact on color rating.  This result shows the significant dependency between Amber 
at FF-DTE and a program size of Small.  Figure 13 shows the contingency table results 
for this analysis.  Table 26 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0433, revealing 
that the probability of Amber10=1 is greater for Small=1 than 0. 
 
Figure 13: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber10 Given Small 
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Table 26: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber10 Given Small 
 
The contingency table in Table 27 shows the expected count of programs being 
Amber during FF-DTE given the program is Small is 2.7, whereas this analysis observed 
5 programs.   
Table 27: Contingency Table for Red6 Given Red 
 
Other Significant Findings 
Of the Tier II relationships tested, 15 flagged as significant dependencies at the 
confidence level α = 0.10; much less than Tier I.  Table 28 shows the remaining 10 
significant findings.  
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Table 28: Other Significant Tier II Results 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, the overall color rating trends of both Tiers I and Tier II are 
explained to present the foundation of the research.  The contingency table analysis of 
significant variables is shown, and a separate in-depth analysis for each of the top five 
predictor variables for both Tiers I and II is presented.  Statistical testing and patterns 
found within the data were discussed as they relate to recommended program 
management response on future programs.  Lastly, significant variables outside of the top 
ten in-depth analyses are summarized.  In the next chapter, the research is concluded and 
broad discussions and meaning to the analysis is presented.
Response Predictor Fishers Exact Test Direction
Green10 AF 0.0547 Left
Green10 Navy 0.0547 Right
Red10 Green6 0.0635 Left
Green15 Modification 0.0642 Right
Green13 Green6 0.0674 Left
Green6 Amber 0.0749 Left
Green13 Red6 0.0851 Right
Amber15 Red6 0.0851 Right
Amber15 Green10 0.0775 Left
Amber15 Amber10 0.0775 Right
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Overview 
The major finding in this research is the identification of statistically significant 
predictor variables on cost growth risk ratings.  This research also evaluates the traditional 
approach to long-term cost growth review compared to a new longitudinal perspective of 
sectional cost growth.   This chapter reviews the initial research questions to validate that 
the research accomplished the intended goal. Additionally, the limitations of findings are 
reviewed, and areas for future research are identified. 
Research Questions Answered 
1 –How does cost growth behave differently between a segmented 
longitudinal perspective and a traditional lifecycle perspective? 
The answer to this question lies in two parts.  First, when you map the color ratings 
from Tier I (the traditional lifecycle perspective), with Tier II (the longitudinal 
perspective), you can tell a distinct difference in how cost growth behaves at each review 
measured.  The color schemes are dramatically different, with Red dominating the 
traditional approach and significantly more Green and Amber in the longitudinal 
approach.  There is no denying that having a more refined view of an issue can provide 
insight that cannot be seen within the larger, lifecycle trends.  It is in this fact that this 
research provides a fresh perspective on cost growth trends.  Though limited in scope, 
this research paves the way for future research, in looking at cost growth as a near-term 
trend than a long-term burden.   
The second part to this question is a bit more blurry than the first.  While there still 
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remain distinctions between both perspectives, both hold a pretty common trend of 
current performance dictating future performance.  Very little significance was found 
between characteristics of programs (i.e. size, length) for both tiers.  This makes it harder 
to distinguish the differences between the two.  Overall, the predictor variables seem to 
be consistent between both perspectives, although the significance varies among them.     
2 – Are there differences in cost growth trends from a cross-sectional 
perspective, than that of the overall program? 
With respect to both Tier I and Tier II evaluations, the color ratings that were 
defined, and the available data, the answer is yes.  47 total relationships were found to be 
significant at α=0.10.  65% of the significant predictor variables were color ratings of 
previous performance.  This highlights the fact that, while there are some program traits 
that lend to a given cost growth pattern, the overwhelming response of cost growth is 
previous performance.  This reiterates previous studies in that the importance lies with 
making maximum effort to minimize cost growth early in a programs lifecycle, to ensure 
minimal cost growth in the future.  
Findings 
 
The biggest finding was the undisputed influence DTE has on cost growth 
relationships that are found to be significant.  This is perhaps the big-picture take away 
from this research, in that it is a key indicator for management as to where cost growth 
performance has been, and where it will continue to go.  DTE really appears as the crux 
of the program, solidifying the cost growth fate, as you may have it.  These findings echo 
the previous work of Rosado (2011) which uses regression analysis to show DT&E as a 
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level 3 WBS element is a significant driver for overall program EAC growth.   
However, when you look at the overall results from a bigger picture perspective, 
both the predictor and response variables are fairly evenly distributed over the phase of 
the lifecycle impacted.  This held true for both Tier I and Tier II findings.  Figures 14 
through 17 show the breakout of occurrences each program review appeared in either the 
predictor or response variable respectively.   Note that the “Other” category for predictor 
responses accounts for any descriptive variable not defined as a program review point.   
The ambiguity of predictor and response variables within significant findings, 
make this research hard to project a summary result for management use.  The interweb 
of relationships makes for a very complex environment, making it unclear as to which 
factors can really help management project their color rating risk.   
 
 
Figure 14: Tier I Predictor Variable Breakout 
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Figure 15: Tier II Predictor Variable Breakout 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Tier I Response Variable Breakout 
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Figure 17: Tier II Response Variable Breakout 
Limitations 
 
We recognize several major limitations of this research, which may impact the 
applicability to real-world scenarios.  First and foremost, the results are a product of the 
inputs.  That being said, the limitations of our data collection filter through to weaker 
results.  As mentioned earlier, the inherent issues with the SAR pass through to create 
issues within our database.  Most notably, the magnitude of missing review dates really 
impacted the ability to analyze cost growth performance from a longitudinal perspective.  
Every missing date impacts at least two data points.  With an already limited data set, this 
further reduces the sample size available at each testing interval.  
For further research on this database, or for a continuation of its progress, a dive 
into additional sources to help complete and validate data would be essential in 
improving the results.  It is recommended to visit sources of hardcopy SAR data to help 
with older program information.  There were a variety of aircraft programs that were 
0%
26%
27%
20%
27%
Tier II Response Variables
CDR
FF
DTE
IOC
LRS
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excluded due to the unavailability of data, which could be added in to the population 
given it can be located. 
Another limitation to the analysis is the subjectivity of how the color ratings are 
applied.  This research considers Green to represent cost growth of 1 or below.  Many 
would argue that programs are still satisfied with risk if their cost growth falls just 
slightly above 1.  The subjective nature can lead to varying results, potentially changing 
the analysis all together.  Understanding this limitation is necessary in evaluating 
programs in question. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Recommendations for future research encourage the exploration and use of the 
original SAR database, as well as our modified research database.  Whereas our research 
is the first to explore predicting cost growth risk from a longitudinal perspective, it should 
be acknowledged that follow-on research and other methodologies used to predict cost 
growth should be encouraged.  The cost estimating community can only estimate the 
known, but as this research has shown, there are many ways cost growth can be analyzed 
to help decision makers best prepare for known outcomes.  Further exploration is highly 
encouraged to help refine the concept of short-term cost growth analysis.  Ways in which 
this research can be carried forward include: 
• Collect more SAR data to further populate our research database with more 
both more programs, and with population of missing data. This could help 
confirm the significance of predictor variables, and perhaps identify new ones 
as well.  
 
• Perform analysis with a different cost rating scale.  Perhaps a survey of 
program experts could help depict what real-world breakpoints would be 
useful for Green, Amber and Red distinguishers.  
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• Apply this research method to programs outside of Aircraft.  While new 
program review markers would have to be identified (for instance, First 
Flight), the application of the longitudinal perspective to other programs 
would be interesting. 
 
• Develop a statistical model for this analysis.  While this research only carries 
as far as identifying the significant variables, it could be continued to develop 
a model for real-world application.  
 
Chapter Summary  
This chapter discusses the relevant findings, limitations, and future research 
opportunities available for continued analysis. This research serves as a stepping stone for 
future efforts.  The findings contained within this research bridge a gap between previous 
longitudinal studies, particularly as it relates to a program.  This research finds itself 
sandwiched between high-level timeline studies, and detailed EVM studies on individual 
contracts.   
The application of color ratings to cost growth facilitates a new perspective and 
perhaps a more hands-on approach for management involvement.   This research should 
serve as a tool to help bring cost growth analysis to the forefront of decision making, with 
a simple and easily identifiable system.  While exploratory in nature, the analysis of 
variables against this color rating system has validated findings in previous cost growth 
studies, as well as highlighted new areas for further investigation.
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure A1: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-CDR
 
Figure A2: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-FF
 
Figure A3: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-DT 
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Figure A4: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-IOC
 
Figure A5: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-LRS 
 
Figure A6: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-FF 
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Figure A7: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-DTE
 
Figure A8: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-IOC
 
Figure A9: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-LRS
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Figure A10: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-DTE
 
Figure A11: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-IOC
 
Figure A12: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-LRS
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Figure A13: CGF Distribution Summary for DTE-IOC
 
Figure A14: CGF Distribution Summary for DTE-LRS
 
Figure A15: CGF Distribution Summary for IOC-LRS 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Red
 
Table B2: Contingency Table Results for Green2 given Green
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Table B3: Contingency Table Results for Green5 Given Red3
 
Table B4: Contingency Table Results for Red3 given Green2
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Table B5: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Modification
 
Table B6: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Red2
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Table B7: Contingency Table Results for Red given Large
 
Table B8: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Prototype
 
  
72  
Table B9: Contingency Table Results for Green5 given Green2
 
Table B10: Contingency Table Results for Green5 given Green3
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Table B11: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Green
 
Table B12: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Medium
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Table B13: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Red2
 
Table B14: Contingency Table Results for Amber2 given Amber
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Table B15: Contingency Table Results for Red3 given <180 Months
 
Table B16: Contingency Table Results for Green3 given Red2
 
  
76  
Table B17: Contingency Table Results for Green2 given Prototype
 
Table B18: Contingency Table Results for Green3 given Amber2
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Table B19: Contingency Table Results for Amber given Pre-1997
 
Table B20: Contingency Table Results for Amber2 given Medium
 
  
78  
Table B21: Contingency Table Results for Amber given Navy
 
Table B22: Contingency Table Results for Green4 given Red2
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Table B23: Contingency Table Results for Green4 given Red3
 
Table B24: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Green2
 
  
80  
Table B25: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Red3
 
Table B26: Contingency Table Results for Green given Pre-1997
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Table B27: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Large
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 Appendix C 
 
Table C1: Contingency Table Results for Green10 given Air Force
 
Table C2: Contingency Table Results for Green10 given Navy
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Table C3: Contingency Table Results for Red10 given Green6
 
Table C4: Contingency Table Results for Green15 given Modification
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Table C5: Contingency Table Results for Green13 given Green6
 
Table C6: Contingency Table Results for Green6 given Amber
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Table C7: Contingency Table Results for Green13 given Red6
 
Table C8: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Red6
 
  
86  
Table C9: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Green10
 
Table C10: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Amber10
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